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Judges sometimes are unrealistic.  Whatever one’s view ofthe recent Pledge of Allegiance decision, do you rememberClinton v. Jones,1 in which eight justices had no doubt that
there were no serious risks in allowing Paula Jones’ lawsuit to
proceed against a sitting President?2
The Supreme Court’s decision about judicial elections3 shows
how unrealistic five justices can be about what happens in elec-
tion campaigns, and also—ironically—about how much judges
differ from legislators and others who run for office.  Reality was
captured concisely by Robert Hirshon, president of the
American Bar Association, who said,”This is a bad decision.  It
will open a Pandora’s Box . . . .”4 The decision will make a
change in judicial election campaigns that will downgrade the
pool of candidates for the bench, reduce the willingness of good
judges to seek reelection, add to the cynical view that judges are
merely “another group of politicians,” and thus directly hurt
state courts and indirectly hurt all our courts.
After noting the majority and separate opinions (which,
unsurprisingly, open many questions), I predict what litigation
lies ahead, then describe the judicial election scene and
prospects for reform, and last, suggestions to candidates and all
judges.  The decision is not reducible to the simplistic, mis-
leading proposition that “[n]otwithstanding ABA policy to the
contrary, the law of the land now holds that the First
Amendment trumps all other considerations when it comes to
judicial elections.”5
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that Minnesota could
not prohibit a candidate for judicial office from “announc[ing]
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”6
Although that “announce clause” has been law in only nine
states, the decision will impact all but one of the 39 states in
which at least some judges face some type of elections, because
all states have canons limiting what candidates may say in cam-
paigns.7 Another limitation, as Justice Scalia wrote, bars judi-
cial candidates from making “pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office,”—a prohibition that, as he wrote, “is not
challenged here and on which we express no view.”8 As for a
third limitation, “[t]he Court’s treatment of the [‘commit
clause’] precluding a candidate from making ‘statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court’ was, unfortunately, not a model of clarity.”9
Justice Stevens, writing for four dissenters, said this:   
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between
campaigns for the judiciary and the political branches,
Footnotes 
1. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
2. As the Court put it in reversing the lower court’s stay order, “We
think the District Court may have given undue weight to the con-
cern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could
conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his
office. If and when that should occur, the court’s discretion would
permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including
deferral of trial) that interference with the President’s duties
would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President’s
conduct of his office was shown here.”  Id. at 708. 
3. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
4. David G. Savage, Running Stance, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at 32.
5. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Chair’s Column, JUDICIAL DIV. RECORD
(ABA), Summer 2002, at 2.
6. 122 S. Ct. at 2542.
7. Id.  at 2541, n. 13.  Justice Scalia erred in excluding Idaho, which
at the end of 2001 adopted the “pledge or promise” clause.
Jan Baran overstates, and at once corrects his overstatement,
that  “[c]andidates cannot be gagged by Canon 5.”  Jan Witold
Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 12. Two sen-
tences later, he rightly notes that only “the version of Canon 5
used by the Minnesota courts” was at issue here, and only one
part of Minnesota’s canon.  Id.
Baran misstates how Minnesota had treated the “announce
clause.”  He says that “the clause can be read—and was read by
the Minnesota disciplinary committee—to prohibit virtually any
commentary about legal or political issues.”  But Justice Scalia
8 Court Review - Spring 2002
wrote this:
The Lawyers Board dismissed the complaint [against
plaintiff Wersal]; with regard to the charges that his cam-
paign materials violated the announce clause, it expressed
doubt whether the clause could constitutionally be
enforced. Nonetheless, fearing that further ethical com-
plaints would jeopardize his ability to practice law, Wersal
withdrew from the election. In 1998, Wersal ran again for
the same office. Early in that race, he sought an advisory
opinion from the Lawyers Board with regard to whether it
planned to enforce the announce clause. The Lawyers Board
responded equivocally, stating that, although it had signifi-
cant doubts about the constitutionality of the provision, it
was unable to answer his question because he had not sub-
mitted a list of the announcements he wished to make.
122 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
And as Justice Stevens noted, “no candidate has yet been sanc-
tioned for violating the announce clause.”  Id. at 2547, n.2
(emphasis added).   In fact, we cannot find any case in any state
(in the last decade or so) involving a finding of violation of the
“announce clause,” except for J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953
(Ky. 1991), in which the clause was held unconstitutional.  For
that fact, I am indebted to Cynthia Gray of the American
Judicature Society, an outstanding authority on the canons.
But put aside Baran’s tiny errors.  Never has anyone so well
captured the whole matter as he does, saying: “[J]udges must
judge.  They cannot prejudge.”  Baran, supra, at 13.
8. 122 S. Ct. at 2532.
9. National Center for State Courts, Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial
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and by failing to recognize the difference between state-
ments made in articles or opinions and those made on
the campaign trail, the Court defies any sensible notion
of the judicial office and the importance of impartiality
in that context.10
Arguably the most significant point about the majority opin-
ion is that, whether or not they “obscur[ed]” the distinction
between judicial and nonjudicial elections, they did not ignore
it.  They did not adopt what Justice Ginsberg (also writing for
four dissenters) called “the unilocular, ‘an election is an elec-
tion,’ approach.”11 As an example of that approach, she quoted
the dissenting judge below: “When a state opts to hold an elec-
tion, it must commit itself to a complete election, replete with
free speech and association.”12
The majority’s reply reveals that one or more justices are
unwilling or at least unready to strike more (or much more)
regulation of judicial campaigns:
Justice Ginsburg [attacks] arguments we do not
make. [W]e neither assert nor imply  that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to
sound the same as those for legislative office.13
Of course, one cannot say how many of the five majority jus-
tices would strike how much more of the canons, but it is hard
to see why their opinion would have included any such limita-
tion if all five agreed with what Justice Kennedy said alone.
Justice Kennedy, joining the majority but also writing alone,
views judicial elections as like (or not materially different
from) nonjudicial elections, and so he would strike all limits on
candidate speech.  But he made two important points about
what can be done to meet injudicious conduct in judicial cam-
paigns.  First, he said that states “may adopt recusal standards
more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges
who violate these standards.”14 In the most significant step
since White—a step rich with promise for the overwhelming
majority of candidates who want to campaign judiciously—the
Missouri Supreme Court has taken up the justice’s invitation, as
noted below.  Second, Kennedy also encouraged what is often
called “more speech to meet speech”:  
The legal profession, the legal academy, the press,
voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all
interested citizens can use their own First Amendment
Freedoms to protest statements inconsistent with stan-
dards of judicial neutrality and judicial excellence.
Indeed, if democracy is to fulfill its promise, they must
do so.15
Justice Stevens made the same
point, adding that even official
bodies like the defendant board
in this case “may surely advise
the electorate that such
announcements demonstrate the
speaker’s unfitness for judicial
office.  If the solution to harmful
speech must be more speech, so
be it.”16
Justice O’Connor, who also
joined the majority and wrote
alone, took a familiar and simple
approach: we shouldn’t have
judicial elections, because of the
fundamental tension between
judicial independence and elec-
tions.  But she ignored reality: the
difficulty of ending judicial elections.  For example, Florida’s
voters in 2000 (“Yes, Virginia, there were other things on the
ballot!”) overwhelmingly rejected changing from contestable
elections for their trial judges to the same system of merit-
appointment and “retention” elections that they have for their
appellate judges (with voters deciding only whether a sitting
judge continues or not).  The opposition to the change was led
by all the women’s and minorities’ bar associations; similarly in
1987, Ohio voters overwhelmingly agreed with the opposition’s
key advertisement against change: “Don’t let them take away
your vote!”17
The surest result of the White decision is (for a change)
more litigation, of three types.  First, there will be two kinds of
lawsuits about the surviving provisions that regulate judicial
campaign speech, the “commit clause” and the “pledge or
promise Clause.”  There will be attacks on the facial constitu-
tionality of each clause, and there will be disputes about
whether this or that particular statement violated one or both
of those clauses.  Second, there will be litigation over whether
the 17 states that have chosen nonpartisan elections for all or
some of their judges can preserve the nonpartisanship they
prefer.  Minnesota, like most or all these states, bans party
endorsements—indeed, the plaintiff who brought the White
case was joined by the Republican Party of Minnesota because
of that provision.  Their attack on it was rejected in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court excluded that issue when it
granted certiorari—but now that we have White, surely courts
will be asked to revisit this issue.  In addition, the nonpartisan
states limit judicial candidates from announcing their own
Spring 2002 - Court Review 9
Election Law, July 12, 2002 memo analyzing the case (on file with
the author).
10. 122 S. Ct. at 2546.
11. 122 S. Ct. at 2550, 2551.
12. Id. at 2550-51 (quoting Judge Beam, dissenting, 247 F.3d 854,
885,  897 (8th Cir. 2001)).  Judge Reinhardt has also taken the
“unilocular” approach.  See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 286,
291-96 (9th Cir. 1990) (concurring opinion).  For other exam-
ples, see Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and
Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659, 663-65 (2002) (on “‘An
Election is an Election is an Election’: The mantra that passed for
analysis in the decisions limiting Canon provisions”).
13. 122 S. Ct. at 2539.
14. Id. at 2544, 2545.
15. Id. at 2545.
16. Id. at 2546.
17. For the Florida and and Ohio developments, see Roy A.
Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and
Challenge, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. REV. 849, 886-90.
Arguably the
most significant
point about the
majority opinion
is that, whether
or not they
“obscur[ed]” the
distinction
between judicial
and nonjudicial
elections, they
did not ignore it. 
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party affiliation.18 Will that limitation stand up?  Last, all but
four of the 39 states bar judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign funds; most of these states also limit the
time period for fund-raising.19 Will these limitations survive?
One other prediction: White will figure, perhaps substan-
tially, in the next U.S. Senate confirmation hearing of any nom-
inee for a federal judgeship who holds back in answering sena-
tors’ questions.  Justice Ginsburg drew upon several of the
briefs for, as Justice Scalia put it, “repeated invocation of
instances in which nominees to this Court declined to
announce [views on disputed legal issues] during Senate con-
firmation hearings . . . .”20 Scalia answers that the majority “do
[not] assert that candidates for judicial office should be com-
pelled to announce their views . . . .”21 Stay posted!
Justice O’Connor’s call to change the current scene must be
realistic about the scene.   Of the nation’s 10,000 state judges
(appellate and general-jurisdiction trial), 87% face elections of
some type: 53% of appellate judges face contestable elections,
partisan or nonpartisan, and another 34% face retention elec-
tions.  Of our trial judges, 77% face contestable elections, only
10% face retention elections.  That’s after a century of major
effort by the bar and good-government groups for adoption of
the “merit” retention system.  At that rate of change, we need
160 years to end contestable elections for appellate judges and
770 years for trial judges.  “Judicial reform is not for the short-
winded,” as New Jersey’s great Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt
taught.  But true as it is that for the last generation legislators
and voters have rejected “merit” systems, perhaps we are enter-
ing a new era, perhaps recent changes in judicial elections will
increase voters’ willingness to change systems.  Meanwhile, don’t
we need to work at reducing the problematic aspects of judicial
elections?
Until 1978, judicial elections were as uneventful as “playing
checkers by mail.” That year in Los Angeles County, a number
of Jerry Brown-appointed trial judges were defeated.  Then in
the 1980s in Texas, campaign spending soared.  But the biggest
change occurred in 2000 when campaign spending set sharply
higher records in 10 of the 20 states with high-court elections;
nationally, high-court candidates raised 61%
more than ever before.  And outside groups
like the Chamber of Commerce spent about
$16 million in just the five liveliest states:
Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and
Ohio.  The campaigning in 2000, “nastier and
noisier,” was more like nonjudicial campaigns
than ever before.22
The states that chose judicial elections did
not want them to be like other elections.
Elections seemed less problematic than
appointments, which seemed elitist or mere
political patronage or both.  But those states
accompanied judicial elections with constitu-
tional provisions unthinkable for other elec-
tive officials—like uniquely long terms. The
constitutions of the 39 states in which judges
face elections have an array of such provisions,
unique to the judiciary, to accommodate the
choice of popular selection with the constitu-
tional value of judicial independence.  In all
39 (except Nebraska), judges’ terms are longer
than those of any other elective official.  In 37
of these states, only judges are subject to both
impeachment and special disciplinary process.
In 33, only judges are required to have train-
ing or experience or both (with the minor
18. In Washington, a judge put out material that included this:
“Bearing in mind the nonpartisan position a judge must maintain
while on the bench, it may be useful for you to know that Judge
Kaiser’s family have been lifelong Democrats.  Indeed, Judge
Kaiser has doorbelled for Democrats in the past.”  Matter of
Kaiser, 111 Wash.2d 275, 278, 759 P.2d 392, 394 (1988) (censur-
ing the judge for that and other statements).
19. ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT,
PART 2 (1998), at n. 73 and at 47-49.  The former limitation was
sustained in the lower courts here and not appealed.  247 F.3d
854, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2001).  The latter limitation was stricken in
Zeller v. The Florida Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995),
severely criticized in the Report, n. 83.
20. 122 S. Ct. at 2539, n. 11.
21. Id. (emphasis in original)
22. See Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, supra note 17, which
was cited by Justice O’Connor for this point. 122 S. Ct. at 2541,
2542.  She also cited the important 1998 ABA Report (Part 2) of
the Task Force on Lawyers’ Political Contributions, which led to
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s 1999 amendments with
respect to campaign contributions.  For the earlier events, see
Report at 13-18.
SELECTION AND RETENTION SYSTEMS FOR STATE COURT JUDGES
APPELLATE COURTS
Total appellate judges: 1,243
Total that stand for some form of election: 1,084 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 659 (53%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 582 (47%) Appointment: 133 (11%)
Partisan Election:  495 (40%) Partisan Election: 400 (32%)
Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%) Nonpartisan Election: 166 (13%)
Retention Election: 518 (43%)
GENERAL JURISDICTION TRIAL COURTS
Total trial judges: 8,489
Total that stand for some form of election: 7,378 (87%)
Total that stand for contestable election: 6,650 (77%)
INITIAL TERM SUBSEQUENT TERMS
Appointment: 2,061 (24%) Appointment: 1,013 (12%)
Partisan Election:  3,669 (43%) Partisan Election: 2,360 (28%)
Nonpartisan Election: 2,759 (33%) Nonpartisan Election: 2,891 (35%)
Retention Election: 2,127 (25%)
exception that in ten of those, the attorney general is subject to
similar requirements).  In 23, only judges are subject to
mandatory age retirement.  In 21, only judicial nominations go
through nominating commissions; in six states, this applies
even to interim appointments.  Last, in 18 states, only judges
cannot run for a nonjudicial office without first resigning.23
The impact of elections on judicial independence is ampli-
fied because so many states have such short terms for judges.
Although terms are uniquely long in some states (e.g., 14 years
in New York, 12 in California), in 15 states even the high
courts have only six-year terms; in 25 states, trial judges have
six-year terms and in another nine states, only four years.24
Can one avoid being deeply troubled by what short terms may
mean for nonroutine cases at all levels, and at the trial level, for
example, for sentencing and rulings on bail?
Of appellate judges who face elections, 38.5% have terms of
10 to 15 years and another 60.6% have six-to-eight-year terms.
Of trial judges who face elections, 13% have terms of 10 to 15
years, and another 67.6% have six-to-eight-year terms.   This
pattern shows that the choice of elections, “while perhaps a
decision of questionable wisdom, does not signify the aban-
donment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying out its
duties fairly and thoroughly.”25 The 39 states have recognized
that, far from fulfilling the historic purpose in allowing for the
popular election of judges, any effort to treat judicial elections
like others acutely undermines the judiciaries’ independent
role under their constitutions. These states’ balanced approach
to the proper structure for an elected judiciary embodies the
understanding that 
the word “representative” connotes one who is not
only elected by the people, but who also, at a mini-
mum, acts on behalf of the people. Judges do that in a
sense—but not in the ordinary sense. . . .  The judge
represents the Law—which often requires him to rule
against the People.26
Five justices have decided that judicial election campaigns
cannot be kept as different as the states want.  The Pandora’s
Box that ABA president Hirshon predicts, will be opened by
the small minority of judicial candidates who simply want to
win—but given the dynamics of campaigns, those few candi-
dates may fuel a race for media coverage and appeals to single-
issue groups.  
Keeping judicial elections judicious involves not only the
First Amendment, but also the due process rights of litigants to
open-minded judges.  Further, as judicial campaigns become
more like other campaigns, more judges will become more like
politicians—and more people will so view judges generally.
Do we want decisions on, say, the First Amendment (and other
constitutional protections) made by people who are more like
legislators . . . or different from legislators?  If judges are more
like legislators, won’t that threaten the legitimacy of having
courts review the constitutionality of actions by the political
branches?
Perhaps more states will end contestable judicial elections.
But meanwhile?  First, what should candidates do now?  Take
advantage of what the Missouri Supreme Court ordered in
response to White: After noting which of their provisions will
no longer be enforced and which remain in full force and
effect, they provided (to finish their less-than-two-page order)
as follows:
Recusal [which there includes disqualification], or
other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of
any judge in cases that involve an issue about which
the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise
may be appropriate under the Code of Judicial
Conduct.27
That is an inspired step.  It supports the overwhelming major-
ity of candidates who want to campaign judiciously—they’ll be
able to say, “I know what you’d like me to say, but if I go into
that then I’ll be unable to sit in just the cases you care about
most.”  In addition, it enables any candidate whose opponent
has stretched the envelope (with some variant of “I’ll hang
them all,” or “I believe that anyone convicted of child abuse
should receive the maximum sentence allowed by law,” or “I’m
a tenant, not a landlord”) to respond with, “My opponent has
told you what he thinks you want, but hasn’t told you that he
won’t be able to deliver, because he’ll be disqualified from the
cases you care about.”
The most important single step to meet the challenges
inherent in judicial elections was urged in May by Ohio Chief
Justice Thomas J. Moyer—lengthen judicial terms to eight or
10 years.  That single step will not only reduce the problems
inherent in judicial elections but also go far to enlarge and
enrich the pool of people willing to seek to serve as judges, and
to induce good judges to continue serving.  After all, improv-
ing the caliber of who serves as judges is the whole goal of all
judicial selection reform.
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23. See amicus brief submitted in White on behalf of the Conference
of Chief Justices, at 6-7.
24. See Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
149,154-55 (1998).
25. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991).  
26. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphases in original).  
27. In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B.(1)(c) (July 18, 2002).
More than half of Missouri’s trial judges run in partisan elections.
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